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abStract
This article aims to show the changes and potential consequences in the 
economic relations between the EU and Southern Africa, that the Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) scheme is promoting. The main arguments for 
changing the previous model, and for the deployment of a new discourse and 
practice by the EU, clash with the approaches and proposals of some gover-
nments in Southern Africa, and also with the views of many scholars. There-
fore, it is pertinent to ask to what extent can EPAs be really developmental in 
Southern Africa and coherent with the rhetoric of partnership and promotion 
of development by the EU in this region and the whole continent.
Keywords: European Union; Southern Africa; Economic Partnership Agree-
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reSumen
Este artículo quiere mostrar los cambios producidos y las consecuencias 
potenciales en las relaciones económicas entre la UE y África Austral como 
consecuencia de los Acuerdos de Asociación Económica (AAE). Los principales 
argumentos para la transformación del modelo anterior, y el nuevo discurso y 
práctica de la UE, chocan con los enfoques y propuestas de diversos gobier-
nos de África Austral, así como de muchos académicos de dentro y fuera de 
la región. De este modo, parece pertinente preguntarse hasta qué punto los 
AAE pueden realmente ser un instrumento de desarrollo en África Austral, y 
coherentes con la retórica de la UE en torno al partenariado y la promoción del 
desarrollo en la región y en el conjunto del continente africano. 
Palabras clave: Unión Europea; África Austral; Acuerdos de Asociación 
Económica; Desarrollo.
JEL Classification: F15; 010; 019; 055.
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1. introduction: the underpinningS of epaS
Open regionalism is being transformed into a new strategy for the dere-
gulation of world trade and investment – one which is both outward looking 
and consistent with the current stage of world liberalization. This strategy is a 
response to a plan by the rich industrial countries of the North to consolidate 
their international position through a set of formal agreements with countries 
of their respective areas of influence in the South. It is also an attempt by 
the countries of the North to expand their export markets and Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) opportunities and improve their competitiveness as against 
other countries of the Centre and their respective peripheries.
The logic of this strategy includes restructuring the relations between the 
European Union (EU) and its former African colonies known as the ACP coun-
tries (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific). The relations of these countries with the 
EU were previously organized within the successive Lomé Conventions (I–IV). 
But in the year 2000 the signing of the Cotonou Agreement opened the way to 
a series of changes to the previous structure, leading to the signing of Econo-
mic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). These were supposed to pave the way for 
the future establishment of large free trade zones between the EU and various 
already established regional groups in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).
The drawn-out negotiation processes of the EPAs reflect intense disagre-
ements about their potential effects. The southern region of the African con-
tinent is representative of the controversies that these moves are generating, 
and of their negative and positive effects on conditions for development, both 
for individual countries and for the region’s most important integration project, 
SADC (the Southern African Development Community). Since the negotiations 
and interim agreements have now gone beyond the opening debates in favour 
of or against the proposed new framework, it is a fitting moment to investigate 
what kind of EPAs, or relations with the EU, the countries of the region should 
pursue in order to accelerate their development.
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2. african regional integration and the neW regionaliSm
2.1. regionaliSm in africa
Regional initiatives in Africa arose as part of the process of gaining poli-
tical independence; they were supported by a pan African philosophy which 
adopted a pragmatic approach towards the various regional groupings then 
underway, treating them as pieces in a continent-wide jig-saw which would one 
day be completed.
Decades of structural adjustment, however, as well as the current impasse 
of the multilateral trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
have given rise to a new form of regionalism. This new approach interprets 
regional integration initiatives more as ‘building blocks’ or intermediate pha-
ses of a wider global liberalization agenda, rather than ‘stumbling blocks’ or 
defence mechanisms that prevents worldwide deregulation. There is growing 
support, therefore, for regional integration, understood as a synonym for eco-
nomic liberalization in a defined multi-state area, as long as it is not an obstacle 
but a step on the way towards an eventual deregulation and complete opening 
up on a world scale on the lines of the current neoliberal globalization model 
(Panagariya, 1999; Bhagwati, et al., 1998; Bhalla and Bhalla, 1997).  
This new notion of open regionalism means at the same time a spatial exten-
sion of the concept of region to groupings with a continental or even intercon-
tinental membership, exemplified in the initiatives towards integration between 
countries with major differences in their socio-economic levels (North–South 
regionalism). This idea has given rise to a number of projects such as the North 
American Free Trade Agreement,1 the Central American Free Trade Agreement, 
and the currently paralysed Free Trade Area of the Americas (to include the 
whole of the American continent), as well as similarly extensive projects in other 
continents, between the countries of ASEAN2 and China for instance, or between 
countries in the ACP group and the EU following the end of the Lomé era.
While such initiatives have often been interpreted as an intermediate step 
towards freer trade and investment on a world scale, their real meaning can 
also be seen from another viewpoint. They can be interpreted as part of com-
peting attempts by the countries of the Centre to maintain and extend their 
trade and investment activities by means of formal agreements with countries 
they regard as part of their Periphery or sphere of influence (Bidaurratzaga & 
Colom, 2005; Bowles, 2002; Hettne et al., 1999).
In any event, this new pattern of extended regionalism is part of a concept 
of integration which, on the one hand, appears to reduce it merely to trade 
1 The North American Free Trade Agreement, in force since 1994, is composed of the USA, Canada 
and Mexico. The Central America Free Trade Agreement comprises the Dominican Republic, Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua and the USA. It came into force in 2006. 
2 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN, currently includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.
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issues, involving very limited institutionalization beyond free trade areas, but 
which, on the other hand, extends the number of questions considered to be 
‘trade-related’ (including issues such as intellectual property, liberalization of 
FDI, public procurement, competition policy and so forth). This kind of pattern 
has come to be known as the ‘WTO+’ norms, given that its elements include 
more than the current WTO agreements on such issues. At the same time, very 
little attention is given to compensatory mechanisms which might help to re-
distribute the costs and benefits of integration on an equitable basis between 
countries at very different levels of development. Even when equitable measu-
res do exist their level and extent are very limited and insufficient to compen-
sate for the adjustment costs (Goodison, 2009; Bidaurratzaga & Marín, 2006).
2.2. changing approacheS: from lomé to cotonou
The Lomé model, born in 1975 in the form of Lomé I (the successor to the 
Yaundé I and II conventions) was the main framework within which relations 
between Western Europe and its former ACP colonies were managed up to the 
expiry of Lomé IV in 2000. The convention brought together 48 Sub-Saharan 
African countries3 of which three quarters were Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs).
The Lomé Conventions shaped the general development aid policy of the 
European Economic Community, which apart from the specific fields of techni-
cal assistance and financial aid (implemented through the European Develop-
ment Funds: EDF I–VIII), had as one of the central elements of this policy the 
preferential non-reciprocal access to the European market for products from 
the ACP countries.4 On the one hand, this was interpreted as being an element 
of positive discrimination in favour of the SSA countries, and as such formed 
part of post-colonial moves towards a New International Economic Order that 
could potentially contribute to developmental outcomes. On the other hand, 
the system also helped European countries, by providing them with privileged 
access to African raw materials at a time when their prices were rising on world 
markets.
After the review of Lomé IV in 1995, a debate opened up about the results 
of the Conventions and the need to change the existing pattern of relations. 
3 The only countries remaining outside these agreements are the five North African countries, which 
at present have their own specific framework of relations with the EU and the non-African countries 
of the Mediterranean region. 
4 Apart from the special rules for certain goods such as bananas, beef, rum and sugar, the agreements 
basically included manufactured and agricultural products which did not compete with products 
included in the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), in other words generally tropical 
products. As well as the areas such as humanitarian aid or structural adjustment financing, found 
in most development aid programmes in previous decades, the Lomé Conventions included in the 
trade field some more unusual elements, such as Stabex and Sysmin, which were designed to stabilise 
export incomes from agricultural and mining products respectively.
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The first major intervention in this discussion was provided by the publication 
of the so-called ‘Green Paper’, in which for the first time the European Com-
mission formally launched its main arguments for a basic re-examination of the 
existing scheme.
In this document the Commission emphasised its dissatisfaction with the 
previous model with regard to both its ambitious general aims (poverty re-
duction and faster economic and social development) and also its lesser and 
more concrete targets (the share of the ACP countries’ exports in European 
markets). In fact, the percentage participation of EU imports from ACP coun-
tries (and from SSA) had fallen rather than risen. There was a major contrast 
here with other developing economies, especially in Asia, which had increased 
their share of exports to the European market even though they had received 
no preferential treatment.5
Figure 1 shows the imports of the EU-27 from various country groups, inclu-
ding the ACP countries and the member countries of SADC, for the years 1999 
to 2011. Unlike some other regions, and some Asian countries in particular, the 
percentage of these two groups in EU imports does not increase although for 
both groups the absolute volume of imports did grow significantly.6
During the Lomé era, Asian and Latin American countries generally in-
creased their volume of exports to the European market more than the ACP 
countries. Nonetheless, it is important to note that when there was a higher 
margin of preference compared with other developing countries the increase 
in exports from the ACP countries was substantially greater. In other words, 
although the volume of exports of ACP countries to the EU grew only 3.6 per-
cent between 1988 and 1997, the number of products receiving preference of 
more than 3% above the GSP level grew by 61.9 percent (17 times as fast). In 
the case of SADC, this disaggregation of the data shows an even more marked 
contrast: during the same period the overall volume of exports fell by 5.4 per-
cent, whereas the products receiving more than 3 percent preference above 
the GSP level grew by 83.6 percent (Goodison & Stoneman, 2005; Davies & 
Mbuende, 2002; Goodison, 2000).
In addition, the results are better for certain countries which received more 
5  To be precise, between 1976 and 1992 the ACPs share of EU imports fell from 6.7 to 3.7 percent 
although in volume terms ACP exports to the EU grew at 2 percent a year. This was much slower than 
the annual growth of exports to the EU from Mediterranean countries (6 percent) or Asian countries 
(12 percent) (Goodison & Stoneman, 2005).
6 In absolute terms, imports from ACP countries rose by 164 percent between 1999 and 2011 
but their importance as sources of EU27 imports increased from 4.5 to 5.2 percent. EU27 imports 
from SADC rose by 122 percent in the same period; their share moved slightly from 2.2 percent in 
1999 to 2.1 percent in 2011. The so-called ‘dynamic Asian economies’ (DAE: South Korea, Hong 
Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand) increased their exports to the EU27 by 41.8 percent 
in absolute value, which, given the general increase in EU imports, their share fell by 4.7 percentage 
points. The most spectacular increase, both in total value and in percentage of the total, was from 
China (excluding Hong Kong). Total Chinese exports to the EU rose by 457 percent between 1999 
and 2011 and China’s share of EU imports increased from 7.1 to 17.1percent in that period.
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trade advantages than those offered by the basic Lomé non-reciprocal prefe-
rence scheme (in the form of quotas, for instance).7 For this reason some scho-
lars have questioned the objectivity of the EU when it declares the Lomé sys-
tem to have been a failure, given that the EU fails to mention other problems of 
a structural, supply-side nature in SSA countries, such as their specialisation in 
a limited range of primary products which were facing over-supply and falling 
prices in the world market. Another usual claim based on weak evidence to 
justify the substitution of the Lomé framework, is the erosion of the preference 
gap due to the advance of the GATT liberalization programme. These points 
suggest that the verdict on the previous preferential system is a good deal 
more complex than the EU has admitted (Hurt, 2009, 2003; Mold, 2007a,b; 
Goodison & Stoneman, 2005).
figure 1. ShareS of variouS groupS of countrieS in the importS of the eu(27), 1999–2011
million euroS and percentage of total eu importS
Source: EUROSTAT
Moreover, if the preferences had been such a failure it would be hard to 
understand why African governments insist that the old model should be retai-
7 Countries such as Botswana, Swaziland, Namibia, Mauritius and Zimbabwe had significantly 
increased their income in the SADC thanks to the advantages offered by special protocols for 
sugar and beef. These facts, in contrast to the general opinion about the effectiveness of the Lomé 
Agreements, show that for the favoured nations preferential trade has played an important role in 
ensuring that the SADC countries are not marginalised from international trade flows (Goodison, 
2000; Matambalya, 1998).
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ned, as well as the fact that the EU itself proposed to continue non-reciprocal 
preferences for the worst-off economies (the LDCs) rather than submit them to 
the reciprocal trade rules of the EPAs (Faber & Orbie, 2009).
The EU’s arguments highlight the incompatibility between the Lomé model 
and the WTO principles in relation to reciprocity and non-discrimination.8 Also 
the importance of differentiating between different ACP countries on the ba-
sis of their level of development, by giving more favourable conditions to the 
LCDs, led the European Commission to stress the need for changing the Lomé 
model. In spite of these incompatibilities, it has been possible in recent years 
to continue to apply this model thanks to the acceptance of two requests by 
the EU for temporary exemptions from the WTO multilateral norms, the last 
of these expiring on the 31 December 2007. The possibility that EU could 
continue to press for temporary exemptions has also been pointed out by se-
veral scholars as evidence of the EU’s lack of political willingness to search for 
alternative models more in line with the interests of the ACP countries (Faber 
& Orbie, 2009; Mold, 2007a,b; Hurt, 2003).
Nonetheless, at the end of 1998 the process of negotiation began, which 
would give birth to the Cotonou Agreement. In the negotiations the EU pressed 
strongly for a major reorientation of previous agreements towards a new one 
based on reciprocal liberalization of trade, as a way of improving the efficiency 
and competitiveness of the productive systems of the ex-colonies and their ca-
pacity to participate in the world economy. Paradoxically, the standpoint of the 
representatives of the ACP countries was very different. They always pressed 
for extending the Lomé framework as long as possible and, if this was not fea-
sible, they supported flexibility on the most sensitive issues in the new agree-
ment. They also claimed for a long period of transition to be able to implement 
policies in order to minimise the harmful side effects of the adjustment to the 
new regime (Hurt, 2012, 2003; Lui & Bilal, 2009; Bilal & Rampa, 2006; Hart-
zenberg, 2000; Gibb, 2000).
The leading role of the European Commission’s DG Trade over the DG De-
velopment in the negotiation of EPAs, also helps to understand the biased and 
restrictive approach of the EU throughout this process (Hurt, 2012, 2009; 
Mold, 2007a,b). In this way, all seems to be resulting in unwillingness to ac-
commodate the interests and concerns of ACP countries, and SSA more spe-
cifically, in the final outcome of the negotiations for the new model (Goodison, 
2009).
In June 2000, 18 months after the start of negotiations between the two si-
des, the Cotonou Agreement was signed. It was designed as a substitute for the 
8 The exception to the principle of reciprocity, using the controversial Article XXIV on regional 
integration agreements, was not applicable. And in relation to the Most Favoured Nation clause, 
which signified the absence of discrimination, the Lomé non-reciprocal preference system was 
authorized in the form of an exception using the Habilitation Clause. This permitted Lomé, as long as 
such advantages were given to all developing economies and not merely to some of them (Solignac-
Lecomte, 2001; Gibb, 2000; McQueen, 1998).
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regulatory framework in force during the previous 25 years. The Agreement 
extended the Lomé preferences on a temporary basis up to the end of the ne-
gotiations on the EPAs, expected to be reached by the end of 2007. The basic 
change was that from the old trade regime of unilateral preferences to one of 
reciprocal preferences, under which trade liberalization would occur in both 
directions through the setting up of free trade areas. This was consistent with 
the approach to open regionalism mentioned at the beginning of this paper. 
The new approach was seen as a way of formally tying Europe with its historical 
areas of influence, in a context in which European countries perceive themsel-
ves threatened by the emerging Asian economies, particularly China. (Hurt, 
2012, 2009; Unceta & Bidaurratzaga, 2008; Banarjee, 2007; Berger, 2006).
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the strong increase in recent years in the trade 
flows between SSA and China, coinciding with the reduction of the relative 
importance of Africa’s trade with the EU despite its absolute increase in the 
last decade.
figure 2. importance of china in Sub-Saharan africa´S trade, 1995–2011
Source: UNCTADSTAT, database
0,0
2,0
4,0
6,0
8,0
10,0
12,0
14,0
16,0
18,0
0
10.000
20.000
30.000
40.000
50.000
60.000
70.000
80.000
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
(Share of China in the trade of Sub-Saharan Africa )
($
 m
ill
io
ns
)
Imports from China Exports to China Imports from China (% of total) Exports to China (% of total)
0,0
2,0
4,0
6,0
8,0
10,0
12,0
14,0
16,0
18,0
0
10.000
20.000
30.000
40.000
50.000
60.000
70.000
80.000
1995 1996 1997 19 8 1999 2000 2 1 2002 2003 04 2005 20 6 2 07 2008 2009 2010 2011
(Share of China in the trade of Sub-Saharan Africa )
($
 m
ill
io
ns
)
Imports from China Exports to China Imports from China (% of total) Exports to China (% of total)
282 Eduardo Bidaurratzaga aurrE, artur Colom Jaén, ElEna martínEz tola
figure 3. importance of the eu in Sub-Saharan africa´S trade, 1995–2011
Source: UNCTADSTAT, database
Although it follows a similar logic to that of its American counterparts in trying 
to formally tie the economic relations with respective areas of influence, the Eu-
ropean open regionalism model is different from them in a number of respects.9 
First, unlike the ‘FTAs’ promoted by the US, the expression ‘free trade’10 does not 
appear in their titles, even though it is an explicit objective of the ‘EPAs’. Another 
difference is that the EU model is a package, consisting not only of the reciprocal 
trade regime but also technical assistance and financial assistance (within the fra-
mework of the European Development Funds), as well as the bilateral aid program-
mes of the EU members. Finally, another peculiarity, produced by the previously 
mentioned need for positive discrimination, is the special treatment conceded to 
the LDCs by retaining parts of the previous non-reciprocal regime and extending 
these to all LDCs in the rest of the world, regardless of the membership of the 
ACP group. This last feature results from the Everything But Arms (EBA)11 initiative 
launched by the EU in 2001 (Bidaurratzaga & Marín, 2006).
9 Nevertheless, some scholars claim that despite the differences, the EU is progressively moving 
towards an increasingly restrictive, mercantilist and business/market oriented system (Hurt, 2012; 
Mold & Page, 2007).
10 Before the EPA proposal was made, the European Commission in 1995 published Free Trade Areas: 
an appraisal, in which they set out very clearly the EU perspective in terms of the benefits for Europe 
of promoting a new framework of macro free trade areas in Europe’s area of influence by means of a 
progressive elimination of tariffs (Goodison & Stoneman, 2005).
11 The ‘Everything But Arms’ initiative, as its name implies, allows LDCs tariff- and quota-free access to 
the European market for all products except for arms. In addition to this explicitly mentioned export, 
the initiative also contained a transitory exclusion for some agricultural products such as bananas, 
rice and sugar (Marín, 2008; Goodison & Stoneman, 2005; Page & Hewitt, 2002).
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3. epaS in practice: many negotiationS, feW agreementS
The Cotonou Agreement did not specify the full contents of each of the diffe-
rent EPAs which were to be negotiated. It limited itself to saying that they should 
preferably be set up with already established regional groupings, and that they 
should start at the beginning of 2008 with a process of trade liberalisation which 
would allow the full agreement to be operative by 2020 at the latest. Hence, 
after a year of joint negotiations, the separate negotiations between the EU and 
some of the African regional groupings began in September 2003. 
Four negotiating frameworks were set up corresponding to the EPAs in 
SSA. One of these was with the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), which included its 15 members plus Mauritania. A second was with 
the six members of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community 
(CEMAC) with the addition of São Tomé and Príncipe and the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo. A third was with the 15 members of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), some members of which also negotiated in 
other groups. The last of the four was the so-called ‘Eastern and Southern 
Africa (ESA) group’, consisting of countries from both east and south of the 
continent, made up principally of members of the Common Market for East 
and Southern Africa (COMESA), a regional group within which was also to be 
found the East African Community (EAC) and some other SADC countries. 
From the beginning the European Commission’s timetable was to get the 
EPAs going by January 2008. Their main argument for this was based on the 
expiry of the WTO waiver for the Lomé non-reciprocal preferences, which were 
incompatible with its trade rules. Thus, the European Commission wished to 
make it clear that there was no alternative but to offer EBA treatment for LDCs 
and substantially worse treatment, such as the Generalized System of Prefe-
rences (GSP), for the others.
In opposition to this, most African governments and the network of social 
movements and European and African development NGOs12 continued to in-
sist on the need to make the timetable more flexible and cut down the number 
of issues discussed in the negotiations, advocating a search for an alternative 
to EPAs, which the Cotonou Agreement itself recommends should occur when 
there is no agreement between the parties. Specifically, these proposals inclu-
ded, among other things, restricting agreements to questions related to trade 
(‘light EPAs’), request a further extension of the WTO exemption of the Lomé 
rules, and proposing that the EU concede a ‘GSP+’ or better.13 The absence 
of alternatives applied to the EU’s political will rather than to the possibility 
of finding other options more favourable to the SSA countries (Marín, 2008; 
Mold, 2007a,b; Bilal and Rampa, 2006).
12 See the ‘Stop EPAs’ campaign launched by the African Social Forum in 2004.
13 Via what was called the ‘GPS+’, the EU granted greater tariff preferences to developing countries 
with the weakest economies, as long as they accepted a series of international agreements (on human 
rights, sustainability and governance, among others things).
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At the expiry of the EU´s negotiating deadline in December 2007 there 
existed just one ‘full EPA’ – with the countries of the Caribbean. Meanwhi-
le, most of the other ACP countries that couldn´t benefit from LDC status, 
only signed ‘partial and interim EPAs’, either as individual countries or country 
groups. The only exceptions to this are the cases of Nigeria, Gabon, Congo and 
South Africa. The latter country already had an individual trade agreement 
with the EU (the Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement, TCDA) and 
the other three are exporting under the standard GSP agreement since 1 Ja-
nuary 200814 (EC, 2013; ECDPM, 2011).
One of the Commission’s main arguments for transforming the Lomé model 
was that it conflicts with the WTO´s rule banning non-reciprocal trade conces-
sions. However, this issue was already resolved by the interim agreements. Other 
kinds of sensitive and controversial issues of great interest to the EU, however, 
such as trade in services, intellectual property rights, liberalization of investment, 
public contracts and competition policy, were not included in the interim EPAs. 
That is why the so-called ‘rendez vous clause’ was included in the partial agree-
ments; in this the EU clarified that the negotiating process was not complete and 
that the SSA countries had to continue to negotiate on the issues mentioned. 
All this aroused a good deal of conflict between the parties so that, while the 
African governments demonstrated their opposition to including the missing is-
sues, the EU continued to insist vigorously on the great benefits which full EPAs 
would bring by permitting a wider insertion of the SSA countries into the world 
economy (Hurt, 2009; Marín, 2008; Bidaurratzaga, 2008).
It is still the case that no African region has signed a full EPA. In West Africa 
no regional level agreement has been reached with ECOWAS, nor with CEMAC 
in Central Africa15. In the ESA region the member countries of the EAC16 de-
cided in November 2007 to form a separate EPA despite the fact that, aside 
from Kenya, thanks to the EBA initiative, all of them, as LDCs, would be eligible 
to continue under the old model. After several ups and downs in the negotia-
tion process, no EU-EAC agreement has been signed yet. At the end of 2007 
six ESA countries had initialled an interim agreement, which was signed only 
by four17 in 2009. It should be noted that the interim agreements which have 
been initialled include both LDCs and non-LDCs.18 The percentage of goods 
included in the liberalization process, as well as the speed of the negotiations, 
14 Nigeria and Gabon asked to be included into the list of beneficiaries of beneficiaries of the GSP+ 
scheme, but both requests were rejected by the EC. 
15 In West and Central Africa the current state of the EPA negotiations is falling short of expectations, 
as there are no yet regional interim agreements and only a few individual ones with non-LDCs.
16 East African Community members are the following: Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi and Ruanda. 
17 Seychelles, Mauritius, Madagascar and Zimbabwe signed the agreement, but Comoros and Zambia 
did not. 
18 Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Malawi and Sudan have not initialled the interim agreement due to their 
position as LDCs, which since 2008 has allowed them to export under the EBA initiative. Nonetheless, 
Zambia, which is also an LDC, has initialled an interim agreement as a participant in the ESA initiative 
for the east and south of the continent.
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vary between different countries although all of them are following a timeta-
ble which would result in an EPA by 2022. All countries have issued a list of 
sensitive products to be excluded from the dismantling of their customs tariffs, 
whose infant producers require tariff protection. Finally, regarding the SADC 
region, only 8 out of the 15 member began negotiations and 5 of these19, ini-
tialled an interim agreement, which was signed in 2009 by all of them except 
Namibia. Namibia’s failure to sign the interim agreement is severely delaying 
its start of operations, and the European Commission is putting the Namibian 
government under a lot of pressure to sign it. The main obstacle raised by the 
Namibian representatives concerns the threat that an EPA will represent for 
regional integration, referring specifically to SACU.20 This opinion is shared by 
the South African government. On the other hand, Angola retains its previous 
regime due to it being an LDC, and Tanzania is negotiating in the EAC, while 
South Africa exports to the EU under its own Trade, Development and Coo-
peration Agreement (TDCA)21 signed in 1999 (EC, 2013; ECDPM, 2012-13, 
2011).
Within the labyrinthine complexity of this map of agreements in the various 
regions mentioned, the most troublesome case is that of the regional group SADC, 
characterised by the fact that its members are participating in different negotiating 
groups within the Central, Eastern and Southern regions of the continent.
4. epaS and development in Southern africa
As against the European Commission’s pro-EPA arguments, which owe a lot 
to classical Ricardian arguments in favour of free trade, a large range of critical 
positions have been put forward by African governments, academics and civil 
society.22 They point to the loss of customs revenues, the vulnerability of spe-
cific sectors to European competition, the EU’s double standards, negotiating 
weaknesses on the African side, distortions of the African regional integration 
processes and the inclusion in the negotiations of especially controversial and 
difficult topics (such as the treatment of services, intellectual property rights, 
investment, public procurement and so on).
19 We refer to Botswana, Swaziland, Namibia, Lesotho and Mozambique, being the last two LDCs. 
20The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) is composed of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, 
Namibia and South Africa. In recent years, because of the signing of the interim EPAs with the EU by 
the first 3 of the mentioned SACU members, the other two have called for joint negotiations by the 
whole customs union as its rules demand. 
21 To prevent incoherence in the tariffs between SACU members, more than 50 TCDA tariff categories 
have had to be changed to make consistent with those negotiated by the UE with Botswana, Lesotho 
and Swaziland. 
22 Some studies, roundly opposed by the European Commission, adopt a clear position that these 
agreements are harmful to the ACP countries. The study EUROSTEP (2004): New ACP-EU Trade 
Arrangements: New Barriers to Eradicating Poverty?, for instance, argues that the free trade areas 
proposed by the EU will worsen unemployment, food insecurity, access to financing and to social 
services as well as the vulnerability of women.
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4.1. trade iSSueS
Since European markets for African products are already, with the excep-
tion of agriculture, largely liberalized, the main effect of EPAs will be to increase 
EU exports to SSA. It is not very clear, however, that the new EPA model will 
cause an increase in the region’s exports to the EU. Those who will enjoy bene-
fits from the new accords will be consumers in Southern Africa and producers 
in the EU, to the detriment of the productive structure of the African countries 
on which the burden of adjustment will fall (Hurt, 2012, 2009; Goodison & 
Stoneman, 2005). 
As we can see in Figure 3, until the recent economic recession the trade 
balance of the EU during the last decade has been mainly negative with SSA. 
The trade balance between the EU and SADC follows a similar pattern. So, the 
opening of the markets of these African countries to EU exports will help main-
tain the current trade surplus in favour of the EU, against the opposite trend 
during most of the previous decade. It could also be helpful for the EU in order 
to slow down the growth of the exports from Asian countries, especially from 
China, whose main trading partners in the region are South Africa and Angola 
(Hurt, 2012, 2009, Naidu et al., 2009).
Among the questions which most worry governments in the region are the 
loss of fiscal revenues23 and the resulting reduction of resources in their res-
pective public sectors, as well as the fear of confronting more competitive Eu-
ropean producers in various sectors, even though the speed of liberalization 
may be slower for goods regarded as more ‘sensitive’.
In this respect, the sharp differences in competitiveness and productive 
diversity between the EU and SADC are a central theme. The figures below 
show clearly the large inequalities of this kind between most countries in the 
two regional groups, which is a warning of potential asymmetry in the sharing 
of costs and benefits of market liberalization for the two sides. 
From Figure 4, which illustrates comparative competitiveness,24 we see 
that most of the European economies are in the lower left quadrant, the best 
23 A useful example is the case of the members of the SACU customs union, known as BLNS plus 
South Africa. These countries had to adapt their tariffs as a result of the TDCA agreement between 
the EU and South Africa. Various studies estimated at the time that the loss of fiscal income for 
these countries would be: Botswana 5.3 percent, Namibia 8.6 percent, Lesotho 12.9 percent and 
Swaziland 13.9 percent. The search for alternative government revenues in such circumstances is not 
always easy, particularly in the context of countries in which informal economy is significant. The risk 
that it will weaken the state’s ability to supply basic services should be taken into account (Goodison 
& Stoneman, 2005).
24 The World Competitiveness Index is composed of the weighted means of the following 12 
indicators: institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic framework, health and primary education, 
higher education and training, efficient markets, efficient labour market, development of the 
financial market, technological disposition, market size, corporate sophistication and innovation. The 
first four (competitiveness 1) are grouped under the title of basic requirements, the following six 
(competitiveness 2) under efficiency enhancers and the last two under innovation and sophistication 
factors. For more information on the rank and value of the index for EU and SADC countries see 
Annexe 1 (WEF, 2012-13).
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positions of the two rankings being for Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands and 
Germany. On the other hand, most of the SADC countries are in the upper 
right hand quadrant, which means a low score for both indicators, the worst 
countries being Mozambique and Lesotho25. In the lower right-hand quadrant 
are few economies with a higher score for efficiency enhancers than for basic 
requirements. Here South Africa is exceptional, occupying 37th place for effi-
ciency enhancers and 84th place for basic requirements. In the upper left qua-
drant is Seychelles, which, although it is well situated on basic requirements 
(46th), is as low as 91st in efficiency enhancers. Finally, a noteworthy SADC 
country is Mauritius, which has an acceptable score on both indicators.
figure 4: competitiveneSS: eu27 and Sadc compared, 2012-13
Source: Produced by the authors based on data in WEF, 2012-13.
Regarding the index of export concentration26 there are very marked di-
fferences too in both regional groups as can be seen in Figure 5. Here, at one 
extreme we find the majority of the SADC countries, with Angola the most 
extreme, followed by Botswana and Zambia, most all of them showing higher 
levels of concentration than the majority of EU27 countries, with the exception 
25 It should be taken into account that there is no available data for Angola and D.R. of Congo, being 
both very likely to rank in the lowest positions when it comes to the competitiveness indicators being 
used here. 
26 The value of the concentration index is between 0 and 1 (respectively indicating the lowest and 
highest level of concentration, or the highest and lowest level of diversity).
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of Malta, Ireland and Greece, among others. Among SADC members, countries 
such as South Africa, Tanzania, Zimbabwe27, Namibia, Swaziland and Mauritius 
stand out, as having a greater variety of exports than their neighbours. 
figure 5. index of export concentration (ue27 and Sadc), 2011
Source: UNCTADSTAT database
Under these circumstances, the opening up to the EU competition could be 
very harmful for the existing local manufacturing and food processing indus-
tries in the region, and make very difficult the necessary diversification of their 
economies and the development of nascent industries (Hurt, 2012). The low 
score of most Southern African countries in the wide variety of the “competiti-
veness indicators” included give evidence of them not being well equipped for 
trade liberalization with the EU (Busse, 2010)
Besides, the EU’s trade policy in agricultural products can be described as 
incoherent. Despite the Commission’s offer of ‘duty free – quota free’ access to 
European markets if EPAs were approved, domestic subsidies to the agricultu-
ral sector are still very significant.28 In addition, the EU’s priorities on hygiene 
27 The serious economic, social and political crisis in Zimbabwe in recent years, however, has put it 
among the lowest places in the region with regard to competitiveness.
28  In addition to the whole Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) package, reservations 
were also expressed by Italy, Greece, France, Spain and Portugal as a result of disputes about the 
denomination of some South African wines and liquors, about the market for fruit and derivatives and 
about cut flowers. About 26 percent of the South African agricultural products exported to European 
markets were excluded from the free trade conditions offered by the treaty to this country (Goodison, 
2000).
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and health regulations for food products has since the 1990s led to the appli-
cation of a growing number of minimum requirements, which end up becoming 
another type of trade barrier against SADC countries. This above all affects 
fish and agricultural products and their manufactures, an important part of the 
exports of Malawi, Tanzania, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Swaziland, among others 
(Goodison & Stoneman, 2005).
Apart from trade in goods, the European Commission has shown great in-
terest in including services in the negotiations. That has also produced contro-
versy given that it is seen as a future threat to local firms, present and poten-
tial, in sectors such as telecommunications or banking where European firms 
are very competitive. This view is especially present in South Africa due to its 
position as the main supplier of services in the region, especially to the BLSN 
countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia) (Van der Holst, 2009; 
Goodison, 2009).
In order to compensate for these unequal structures, the EU has set up an 
‘Aid for Trade’ programme that aims to improve the capacity to trade by the 
countries in the region.29 Despite its theoretical potential, the small amount 
of resources assigned to this programme up to now, and the lack of participa-
tion in the design and planning of the scheme by African producers, reveal 
once more the incoherence of the EU’s policies: European producers receive 
generous public aid and programmes to improve the competitiveness of ag-
riculture and food industries, while producers’ associations participate in the 
design of policies to cope with changes in trade and production (Goodison, 
2009).
4.2. other related iSSueS
Investment, intellectual property rights, public procurement and compe-
tition policies also form part of the negotiating package of the EPAs. If the 
capital market is liberalised in the future it is possible to imagine a larger amou-
nt of FDI going to the SADC countries. This reinforces the need to establish 
‘performance requirements’ for investors. Yet, just as in the case of the Latin 
American Free Trade Agreements, the tendency here seems to be the opposi-
te, in the sense that the failed initiative to set up a Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAI) is now returning through the back door in the form of regional 
MAI. Paradoxically, empirical evidence seems to show that recipient countries 
may only benefit from FDI flows if appropriate government regulations and 
institutions are in place (Busse, 2010). In this context, the intention of the EU 
is to prioritise the interests of the European investors against those of govern-
29 The concept of Aid for Trade is not limited to helping with core trade activities such as support for 
improving ports or customs facilities or strengthening partners’ trade negotiation capacity, (the so-
called ‘Trade-related Assistance’), but also to wider questions such as the development of transport 
and telecommunications infrastructure related to trade or assistance to particular productive sectors.
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ments in the region which, as a result, lose their room for manoeuvre to launch 
pro-development policies at a time when European transnational companies 
are moving into their countries (Faber & Orbie, 2009; Intermón-Oxfam, 2008; 
Bidaurratzaga, 2008).
As in the case of trade, the main reasons for the EU to put these trade rela-
ted issues about the liberalisation of FDI on the negotiating agenda are the fo-
llowing: the previous move by its main competitor, the USA, in the same direc-
tion through its Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with Latin American countries; 
and the increasing entry of capital into the region from other non-traditional 
partners such as China, India, Malaysia, Brazil, the Arab countries, South Korea 
and Taiwan (UNCTAD, 2012).
So the EU’s proposals try to go beyond the Cotonou Agreement or the 
WTO rules, adding up to what has been called ‘WTO+’ agreements. This fra-
mework aims to make progress at the regional level on the negotiation of is-
sues which are at present at a standstill at the multilateral level of the WTO 
(Intermón-Oxfam, 2008; Bidaurratzaga, 2008; Keet, 2007). In most cases the 
countries of Southern Africa have neither the capacity nor the need to ne-
gotiate such questions which they have encountered before in the WTO and 
which are not affected by the expiry of the waiver that the EU used as an ar-
gument for changing its previous model (Goodison, 2009; Meyn, 2008; Inter-
món-Oxfam, 2008; Marín, 2008; Keet, 2007). The fact that the EU, the main 
trading partner and donor in the region, has managed to make these issues, 
which the developing countries have always refused to negotiate in the WTO, 
part of the future negotiations on the completion of the EPAs shows the extent 
of asymmetry between the two parties’ negotiating strengths. Unfortunately, 
their inclusion in a full EPA for the SADC region would have a serious detrimen-
tal effect on these countries in terms of reduction of policy space (Hurt, 2012; 
2009).
Mention should also be made of what are known as the ‘contentious is-
sues’: the transition periods, the interpretation of the phrase ‘substantially all 
trade’, the principle of national treatment, regional preference, safeguard clau-
ses and infant industry provisions, the most favoured nation principle and rules 
of origin. The degree of flexibility on these technical questions will determine 
whether their effects will be more or less favourable to the development of the 
countries in the region (Lui & Bilal, 2009).
4.3. additional confuSion: regional overlapping in Southern africa
Finally, as to the effect of the EPAs on the support and strengthening of 
the pre-existing regional groups in SSA, the results up to now are limited, and 
Southern Africa is in this sense paradigmatic. In the case of SADC only 8 of the 
15 members of the group are participating in the current negotiating process 
and, of those, Tanzania has entered an interim agreement with the EAC. Of the 
rest, only 4 (Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique) have signed an 
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interim agreement corresponding to a disfigured ‘SADC-minus’. The first 3 of 
these, plus Namibia and South Africa,30 form the SACU, the oldest customs 
union on the continent. Angola will retain its previous status in its condition 
of LDC, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo has for now entered nego-
tiations with the Central Africa. As for the 6 remaining countries (Madagascar, 
Mauritius, Seychelles, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe), they also belong to the 
ESA group, which is not properly speaking, a regional grouping but rather a 
geographical zone in which 16 members of COMESA participate as an EPA 
negotiating partner, but other COMESA members do not. Burundi, Kenya, 
Rwanda and Uganda (also COMESA members) have negotiated a separate 
agreement with the EAC customs union along with Tanzania, member of SADC, 
as already mentioned (EC, 2013; ECDPM, 2012-13, 2011).
So, taking the SADC region as a reference point, we find various fragmen-
ted negotiation processes in which all its members, apart from Angola, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Africa, have ended up initialling 
interim agreements with the EU with different timetables and content in three 
different frameworks: the SADC, the ESA group and the EAC, included in the 
former. If the negotiating capacity of the ACP countries was already limited, 
this division in different regional groups, which in turn make disaggregated ap-
proaches to new sub-groups, must limit it even further (Keet, 2007; Goodison 
and Stoneman, 2005).  
In contrast to other regions of the continent, in Southern Africa most of 
the LDCs of SADC have signed interim agreements accepting reciprocity in 
their merchandise trade while theoretically counting on the possibility of con-
tinuing with the previous regime of non-reciprocal preferences. This could be 
understood by the fact that for the LDCs not signing an EPA, this situation 
turns problematic in the event of joining a customs union in which any of the 
partners in it has agreed reciprocal trade rules with the EU. That will mean 
either that it is hard to guarantee that such countries can continue to enjoy the 
benefits of the previous regime, or that it will be necessary to establish strict 
mechanisms to control rules of origin, and this will create difficulties for the 
promotion of intra-regional trade (Marín, 2008; Thomas, 2004; Hurt, 2003; 
Solignac-Lecomte, 2001).
Given all this confusion, the external influence of the EU through the EPAs 
is reshaping regional integration initiatives in SSA in general, and in Southern 
Africa in particular, towards neoliberal forms of regionalism, but making them 
more difficult for its member countries at the same time. As a result of the sig-
30 The government of South Africa is particularly dissatisfied with the inclusion of a Most Favoured 
Nation clause in the interim EPA of the SADC group in which the majority of its SACU neighbours 
are participating. This clause, which was not included in the previous agreement (TDCA) with the EU, 
limits South Africa’s trade negotiations with other countries such as Brazil and China (Hurt, 2012, 
2009; Van der Holst, 2009). The disagreement inside SACU, whereby Namibia and South Africa 
oppose signing an interim SADC EPA, clearly shows the distortions and fragmentation wreaked by 
the EPA framework on the pre-existing attempts at integration in Southern Africa (Goodison, 2009).
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ning of agreements reached through negotiations with individual countries or 
with groups of countries which do not correspond to pre-existing regional grou-
pings, initiatives towards African integration will be weakened and distorted31 
(Buzdugan, 2013; Vickers, 2011; Marín, 2008; Thomas, 2004; Matambalya, 
2000). Therefore, the coherence of regional integration in the SADC region is 
currently seriously damaged, given that most of its member states are involved 
in other EPA negotiations. Besides, the ones involved in the EPA-SADC, except 
for Mozambique, are more concerned about its effects on the future of SACU 
than of SADC (Hurt, 2012, 2009). 
If this is to be avoided the following will be necessary: flexible liberalisation 
of customs tariffs and more flexibility on the previously mentioned contentious 
issues; reinforcing the productive capacities of infant industries and of food pro-
cessing production; boosting the building of infrastructure which reinforces inte-
gration; carefully choosing economic policies; and, above all, prior consolidation 
of integration initiatives such as SADC. All this is designed to prevent a prema-
ture outward-oriented integration with the EU producing distorting effects and 
ending up as an inward-looking disintegration of the region’s economies (Hurt, 
2012; 2009; Hartzenberg, 2011; Busse, 2010; Keet, 2007; Lee, 2004).
5. concluSionS
Changes in the world economy over recent decades have led to narrowing 
the topic of regional integration to a simpler policy of freeing trade and other 
economic transactions, and an extension of this approach to groupings of 
countries of the North and South together. This is often interpreted as an in-
termediate step towards the global liberalization of certain markets and as a 
prerequisite for an appropriate insertion of the SSA economies in the world 
economy. Evidently, these tendencies have little to do with earlier approaches 
related to pan-Africanism or integration as an instrument of collective self-
reliance and endogenous development.
Despite its politically correct rhetoric and its supposed concern to promo-
te development in SSA, the EU is attempting at headlong speed to impose 
on these countries economic agreements which guarantee privileged relations 
with its area of influence under the new formula of open regionalism. But these 
in their turn arouse major doubts about their consequences for development 
and about their effect on improving the conditions of life of the poorest people 
in the region.
The EU’s insistence on signing without delay some kind of EPA (interim if a 
full EPA is not possible) seems to have become more urgent as a result of the 
economic relations developing between SSA and non-traditional partners, in 
particular China, the great emerging world economic power. That, along with 
31 It is enough to ask if it is conceivable that member countries of the EU, individually or in small sub-
groups, could negotiate agreements like EPAs with consolidated regional groups in other continents 
without provoking a major political crisis inside the EU itself.
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the EU’s competition for certain mineral and energy resources, has improved 
the policy space of many African governments in different bilateral and multi-
lateral negotiating frameworks and has allowed them to diversify their external 
relations. 
This situation should be used by SSA governments to strengthen their ar-
guments and better defend their interests; they should demand alternatives 
to the EPAs proposed by the EU, more flexibility about timetables, and about 
the issues to be included in the negotiation, as well as specific treatment for 
sectors vulnerable to European competition and more aid funds to compen-
sate for the costs of integration between unequal partners. African and Eu-
ropean social movements, development NGOs and academics also have an 
important function to fulfil in this debate, by continuing their work of clarifying 
the meaning of the disputes and the potential implications of the proposed 
agreements.
The particular case of Southern Africa has so far given few grounds for 
optimism regarding the future effects of EPAs on regional development. The 
asymmetrical negotiating framework consists of, on one side, various SADC 
countries, disaggregated into different groups and with neither coordination 
nor a joint strategy and, on the other side, the EU, which acts as a single sub-
ject, and negotiates with a single voice.
There is no doubt that the region is composed of an amalgam of countries 
with major differences between them and broad inequality within. Their road 
to development depends on a wide matrix of variables, some of them men-
tioned in this paper. The position of the weakest economies and the poorest 
people within them will be determined partly by the nature of regulation and 
deregulation which governs trade, investment, intellectual property rights and 
flows of migrants and partly by compensation mechanisms, aid flows and other 
means of increasing equitable outcomes. 
In this sense, if the European Commission really wishes to promote a new 
agenda of international cooperation according to the principles of the latest 
High Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness (París (2005), Accra (2008) and Busan 
(2011)) and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, it must 
give more attention to the coherence of its own policies and insist less on 
its inflexible and self-interested proposal of open regionalism in the form of 
EPAs. Its insistence on trade reciprocity and the inclusion on the agenda of 
controversial issues which go beyond the WTO agreements only restrict the 
governments of the region from pursuing what they consider to be the best po-
licies. As has only too frequently been shown by African governments, scholars 
and European and African social movements during the negotiations on these 
agreements, they suffer from serious limitations and drawbacks in promoting 
development in SSA in general and in the Southern African region in particular. 
In order to achieve better development outcomes in the region, it would cer-
tainly help to apply a higher degree of flexibility, both of schedule and issues 
to deal with, as well as greater compensation for the cost of adjustment and for 
strengthening regional integration.
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